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In the current debate on migration to Europe, a central concern 
has emerged over the “marginality” of Muslim communities, 
in other words, their seeming failure to “integrate” into the 
mainstream life world. Migrants congregating in mosques or 
Muslim community centres, attending Islamic schools, wearing 
headscarves and exotic “traditional” clothes, and turning to non-
European television programmes are seen as an anomaly in the 
social body of European societies. Underlying this anxiety is the 
implicit assumption that Muslim peoples have an exceptionally 
primordial attachment to “tradition”—some immutable “Islamic 
ways of life”—that is incompatible with modern European 
values and which stands in the way of their integration. 
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If by “integration” is implied the expectation that minorities should become just like 
the majority, that they should assimilate, this can neither be realistic nor just. But 
if “integration” means, as I take it to mean, a two-way process of give and take be-
tween different cultural collectives, then any real integration would involve move-
ment from both minority and mainstream communities. The minorities are expect-
ed to interact with the mainstream, and engage in the economy, civil society, and 
the state institutions while the mainstream is expected to facilitate such exchange 
and engagement, recognizing “minorities” as a part of the national citizenry. 
Given this perception, how much can the claims of “Muslim non-integration” be 
justified? I like to suggest that “integration” is not simply a voluntary “matter of will” 
process where individuals “choose” or “refuse” to integrate; nor are “cultural groups” 
uniform collectives whose members supposedly hold the same aspirations, orien-
tations, and capacities. Rather “minority groups,” whether Muslim or non-Muslim, 
each possess differential capacities for mixing and exchanging with the main-
stream; they hold varied resources to cope with the exigencies of integration. While 
segments of the European Muslims have indeed succeeded in this path, others are 
in the throes of a protracted struggle.
Recent studies confirm that the Muslim minority in Europe represents a mixed 
entity differentiated by ethnicity, class, educational background, and religious in-
clinations. In terms of integration, at least three patterns can be roughly observed.1 
First, “secular Muslims” who seem to be fully integrated as they try to reach out to 
the majority culture, economy, and social interaction, even though they are occa-
sionally frustrated by incidents where many natives refuse to recognize them as 
“Europeans.” Indeed there are some 2,000-3,000 influential Muslims leaders who are 
active in politics, media, business, religious and civil society organizations, and who 
represent the core of an expanding Muslim professional class whose participation 
in the political process, as a new interest group, may affect the European politics. 
These Muslims embrace liberal democracy, resent religious radicals, respect human 
rights as a God-given gift, and wish to build a “European Islam.” Possessing the nec-
essary resources—higher education, respectable jobs, information, and relevant 
knowledge—the group is enabled to handle and live a European life. They enjoy 
and take advantage of what their adopted societies offer and know how to ma-
noeuvre within them.
The second strain within the Muslim minority consists of very small numbers of 
young radicalized groups, about which we know very little for certain. Roughly, 
they tend to be mainly second or third generation Muslims, well versed in the local 
vernaculars, and linked to transnational networks. Yet detached from the governing 
values of ancestry, but engulfed by the multiplicity of lifestyles and flow of informa-
tion, the truth of which they can seldom ascertain, these youngsters tend to re-
sort to an imagined “authentic” reference—a trans-local, global, and abstract Islam 
stripped of cultural influences, one that can serve as vehicle for resentment and 
dissent.
And then there is a significant third group of Muslims which includes largely the 
first generation immigrants who while struggling to speak the European languages, 
striving to hold regular jobs, and establishing the props of a normal life are still 
oriented to practicing many aspects of their home culture—food, fashion, rituals, 
or private religious practices. Most of them struggle to survive and to live in peace 
and with dignity, invest in their children to get by in the societal settings they often 
find too complex to operate. So they tend to restore and revert to their immediate 
circles, the language and religious groups, informal economic networks, and com-
munities of friends and status groups built in the neighbourhoods or prayer halls. 
They feel at home on the margin of the mainstream.
As such, this “feeling at home on the margin” is hardly a thing of Islam, nor a sign 
of resentment against the mainstream, or a primordial desire for “tradition.” Rather, 
it represents a familiar trend—a typical coping strategy that lower-class immigrants 
often pursue when they encounter complex foreign life-worlds. It reflects the para-
doxical reality of peripheral communalism that enables the members to get around 
the costs, to endure the hardship, and to negotiate with the mainstream in an at-
tempt to be part of it. Because to immerse fully in the mainstream requires certain 
material, cultural, and knowledge capabilities that most plebeian migrants, Mus-
lim or non-Muslim, do not possess, which in turn compels them to seek alterna-
tive venues. Thus, being part of an organized economy demands regular payment 
of various dues and taxes; if you cannot afford them, then you go informal. When 
a migrant cannot afford to pay for the cost of fixing his kitchen through regular 
firms, then he or she will look for, or generate, a network of friends, relatives, and 
locals to mobilize support. If he cannot afford to shop in the mainstream modern 
supermarkets, or to borrow money from regular banks (because he does not have 
the credit and credentials), then he resorts to ethnic street bazaars to get his/her af-
fordable supplies, and to informal credit associations to secure loans. When he lacks 
the necessary information and skill to function within the modern bureaucratic or-
ganizations—which do not accommodate flexibility, negotiation, and interpersonal 
relations—he relies on the locals with whom he establishes flexible transactions 
based upon mutual trust and reciprocity. If people cannot operate within the cul-
tural settings that are perceived to be inhospitable, too formal and strict, then they 
are likely to get involved with the ones that allow them to fit.2
An unintended consequence of these economic and cultural processes is the 
likely revitalization of “negative integration,” in parallel and peripheral communi-
ties, where ethnic networks or religious rituals are revived and reinforced to serve 
as structures of support and survival. It is no surprise that “ghettoization” is espe-
cially more pronounced among lower-class British Muslims where unemployment 
remains three times higher than among other minority groups. This process of 
“feeling at home on the margin” represents a way of coping with the imperatives 
of modernity embodied in the bureaucratic arrangement, the discipline of time, 
space, fixed and formal contract, and the like. As such this process is not specific 
to Muslims, but includes all comparable migrant communities. Nor is it limited to 
international migration. Rural migrants in Cairo, Tehran, Istanbul, or Casablanca un-
dergo more or less similar experiences (and receive similar levels of hostility from 
their national elites) as many residents with Turkish or Moroccan origin in Germany 
or in the Netherlands. However, the hostile sentiments of the mainstream political 
and intellectual circles in Europe serve as an additional factor to push such Muslim 
minorities to seek sanctuary within themselves to build a life-sphere on the margin 
which they can call home. Otherwise, they yearn for an integrated status of relief 
and recognition, while they strive to manage and minimize its detriments. “Feel-
ing at home on the margin” is not necessarily the antipode of integration, but can 
instead serve as an antidote. 
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